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Abstract—Safety-relevant systems in the automotive domain
often implement features such as lockstep execution for error
detection, and reset and reexecution for error correction. Light-
lockstep has already been adopted in some such systems due
to its relatively low implementation cost given that it does not
require deep changes into non-lockstep hardware. Instead, as only
off-core activities (i.e. data/addresses sent) need to be compared
across different cores, light-lockstep designs are lowly intrusive.
This approach has been proven sufficient to guarantee functional
correctness of the system in the presence of errors in the cores, in
particular in relation with certification against safety standards
such as ISO26262 in the automotive domain. However, error
detection in light-lockstep systems may occur long after the error
actually occurs, thus jeopardising timing guarantees, which are
as critical as functional ones in hard real-time systems.
In this paper we analyse the timing behaviour of errors due
to transient and permanent faults in light-lockstep systems. Our
results show that the time elapsed until an error is detected can
be inordenately large, especially for permanent faults. Based on
this observation and building upon the specific characteristics of
light-lockstep systems, we propose LiVe (Lightly Verbose), a new
mechanism to enforce the early detection of errors, due to both
transient and permanent faults, thus enabling the computation of
tight error detection timing bounds. We also analyse how existing
mechanisms for error recovery in multicore systems increase their
effectiveness when light-lockstep operates in LiVe mode in the
context of mixed-criticality workloads.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronics in automobiles provide an increasing amount of
complex functionality, with features such as brake assist, active
lane keeping, adaptive cruise control, etc. Today’s vehicles are
becoming more and more reliant on electronic components.
Modern cars can have software components consisting of up
to 100 million lines of code, and each car contains up to
70 ECUs working together under complex conditions [13].
The trend is that software and performance requirements will
continue increasing in the foreseeable future. Recently Gartner
Inc. has reported that “semiconductor content of safety systems
(in automotive) will almost double, from $2.2 billion in 2009
to $4.3 billion in 2014” [15].
For instance, in the automotive domain many manufactur-
ers have started incorporating systems like airbag modules,
electronic parking brakes, tracking and stability control, tire-
pressure monitoring and x-by-wire technology [23], [30] in
the last few years. In particular, x-by-wire technology (for
instance, brake-by-wire and steer-by-wire) replaces several
mechanical control systems with electronic control systems us-
ing electromechanical actuators and human-machine interfaces
such as pedal and steering feel emulators [5], [10]. Hence, tra-
ditional components such as the steering column, intermediate
shafts, pumps, hoses, belts, etc. can be eliminated from the
vehicle. Although these safety systems have the potential to
provide a big improvement in terms of reliability, multicores
and modern semiconductor technologies, both needed for
performance, are inherently unreliable. Therefore, electronics
becomes the reliability-bottleneck. Moreover, existing safety-
critical electronic systems call for increased performance. For
instance, in the early 90s the software for an ABS system
required an electronic control unit (ECU) at 16MHz and only
128KB of memory. By 2004, it required an ECU at 250MHz
(a 15X increase) and around 1MB of memory (an 8X increase)
according to ARM data [36]. The next generation of electric
cars will only be realisable with significantly more powerful
ECUs.
Those semiconductor technologies needed for performance
reasons, however, lead to an increased number of transient
faults due to higher susceptibility to cosmic rays and alpha
particles, as well as due to intermittent faults caused by
small defects that grow enough due to degradation to produce
faults under some particular environmental conditions (e.g.,
low voltage, high temperature) [3]. Permanent faults also
arise either because defects grow enough until they cause
permanent faults, or simply because they escaped post-silicon
test [3]. Transient and permanent faults lead to errors that
can be tolerated to some extent in some markets, but cannot
in CRTES where stringent correctness constraints call for
means to prevent faults from jeopardising the safety of those
systems. This is an issue for 65nm and beyond since Failure
In Time (FIT)1 rates are above the threshold affordable for
many CRTES (e.g., automotive, avionics, space).
Some existing error detection and correction techniques can
cope with both functional and timing correctness required in
CRTES in the presence of faults. For instance, lockstep cores
have been deployed in many systems [19], [17] at different
granularities. This has been shown to be highly effective to
detect errors, but if lockstep is applied at fine grain (e.g.,
comparing the output of each instruction or the output of
each pipeline stage) it becomes too expensive due to (i) large
IP modifications required, (ii) lack of flexibility to use cores
in non-lockstep mode, and (iii) complex validation of the
circuitry in charge of performing a number of across-core
comparisons every cycle.
11 FIT corresponds to 1 failure per 109 hours of operation.
2Alternatively, light lockstep cores offer lower cost and
higher flexibility. Such a design suits very well mixed-
criticality systems where cores may run critical tasks in
lockstep mode and non-critical tasks in non-lockstep mode, as
it is the case of the Infineon AURIX [20], which implements a
3-core processor based on the TriCore architecture (2 lockstep
cores and 1 non-lockstep one), and the STMicroelectronics
SPC56XL60/54 family [33], which implements a 2-core pro-
cessor based on the Power architecture [18].
Under light lockstep mode, outputs are shared through the
shared communication network for error detection. While this
method is able to detect all faults occurring in the cores, it has
a significant disadvantage: the time errors take to reach the
bus and be detected can be long and is unbounded. With the
increasing demand for more computation resources in safety-
critical real-time systems, an efficient usage of computation re-
sources is crucial. In mixed-criticality environments consisting
of several applications with different criticality levels running
concurrently in the same processor (in lockstep and non-
lockstep mode) effectively allocating computation resources to
tasks cannot be achieved if error detection mechanisms allow
significant amounts of computation resources to be wasted.
For example, when several applications are to be scheduled in
the same processor, error detection latency directly affects the
probability of a task to be schedulable [11]. This is a critical
issue since CRTES must provide both, functional and timing
correctness, which must be proven against the corresponding
functional safety standards such as ISO26262 [21] for automo-
tive and DO-178B [32] for avionics. Moreover, resetting the
system to restart the faulty function may not be doable in the
context of mixed-criticality multicores since other functions
with potentially higher criticality levels may also be running
in other cores. Thus, appropriate recovery mechanisms are
needed (i.e. software triggered and/or based on checkpointing),
but their efficiency is jeopardised if it cannot be determined a
(close) point in time when state was still fault-free.
In this paper we analyse the timing behaviour of errors, both
due to transient and permanent faults, and their implications
in terms of certification in light lockstep systems, and provide
an effective solution to limit the delay between error manifes-
tation and detection. In particular, the main contributions of
this paper are as follows:
• An analysis of the timing behaviour of errors due to
transient and permanent faults in the context of light
lockstep processors resembling the Infineon AURIX [20],
proving that a non-negligible number of errors may
remain undetected long after they actually manifest. We
refer to those errors as long lag errors (LLE for short).
Further we show how permanent faults lead to a higher
number of LLE than transient faults due to the lower
masking factor of the former.
• A low cost solution, LiVe, to enforce the early detection
of errors in light lockstep processors by operating in a
LIghtly VErbose mode, thus enforcing periodic checks of
the architectural state through the shared communication
network.
• We show how some of the cross-domain hard-
ware/software challenges that LLE introduce in the con-
text of the ISO26262 automotive safety standard can
be efficiently addressed by using LiVe. In particular, we
illustrate how LiVe facilitates error recovery.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
provides some background on lockstep-based error detection
in safety-critical automotive systems. Section III presents our
simulation framework and the timing analysis of error detec-
tion in light lockstep processors. Section IV introduces LiVe,
our approach to enforce early error detection and presents
some results. Section V reviews certification-friendly recovery
mechanisms and how LiVe helps facing certification chal-
lenges. Related work is described in Section VI. Section VII
draws the main conclusions of this paper.
II. ERROR DETECTION FOR AUTOMOTIVE
SAFETY-CRITICAL APPLICATIONS
Redundant execution has been regarded as an effective
approach for error detection, either by means of time or space
replication. In particular, time replication (e.g., reexecution
in the same core) [31], [27] is particularly suitable to detect
soft errors. However, some significant hardware modifications
are required if reexecution must occur simultaneously in a
simultaneously multi-threaded (SMT) core. Alternatively, the
program can be executed serially twice in a single-threaded
core, but this may roughly double execution time. Either way,
errors produced due to permanent and intermittent faults (e.g.,
those caused due to degradation or “telegraph radio noise” [4])
are very likely to repeat in both executions, thus remaining
undetected. Instead, space replication requires the execution
of the program in two distinct cores, typically simultaneously.
Such an approach is able to detect any type of error as long as
diverse implementation for the cores is used as, for instance,
in the AURIX processor [20]. Diverse implementation consists
of using, for instance, different sets of gates or gate designs to
implement the same function so that identical layout patterns
under exactly the same stress (inputs, voltage, temperature,
etc.) – and so with similar process variations and similar mean
time to failure – are avoided as much as possible. Next, we
review the granularity at which comparison across redundantly
executed programs can be performed and some particular
lockstep implementations.
A. Sphere of Replication
The granularity at which outputs of redundantly executed
programs are compared is usually known as the sphere of
replication [29] or SoR for short. Such SoR can be defined
at the granularity of instruction so that the output of each
instruction is compared across redundant threads. However,
the overhead of this approach across threads is non-negligible
and cannot be performed across the shared communication
network to reach memory and I/O since it would become a
bottleneck if the outcome of all instructions is to be compared
(i.e. values and addresses). Therefore, specific queues and
communication channels are required to perform such per-
instruction comparison, which is expensive. However, error
detection occurs immediately when the execution of the faulty
instruction completes.
3Fig. 1. Schematics for different SoR.
Conversely, other approaches rely on a SoR defined at the
memory and I/O interface granularity, so that only off-core
activity is compared across threads. Those approaches rely
on the fact that once the program finishes, only memory
and I/O state matters, so in-core activity can be ignored.
Thus, this approach suffices to detect meaningful errors. Also,
its overheads are much lower than those when the SoR is
defined at the instruction level since it is only needed to snoop
the information flowing through the shared communication
network to check that addresses and values sent from the cores
match. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee on how long an
error will take to manifest at the off-core SoR. Therefore, it is
possible that an error occurs at the beginning of the execution
but does not manifest until the program is about to finish.
Those errors, LLE, are typically not an issue in many domains
where timing is non-critical, but they jeopardise safety of
CRTES, which rely on both functional and timing correctness.
B. Lockstep Systems
Many commercial systems can be clearly classified accord-
ing to their SoR. For instance, HP non-stop servers [9] perform
lockstep execution at a very coarse SoR since full boards
are replicated and only off-board activity is compared (see
Figure 1(d)). Due to such coarse granularity, intrusiveness of
lockstep in the design is really low and can be easily and
efficiently implemented in software layers only. Although error
detection is guaranteed, long time may elapse since errors
occur until they are detected. Nevertheless, target domains for
such systems only care about functional correctness and timing
only matters to some extent. False positives can occur in these
designs if a fault manifests beyond the board boundaries but
has no semantic impact in the application, thus not becoming
an error. However, the likelihood of faults being errors at off-
board granularity is high.
In the opposite side we can find some examples of pro-
cessors delivering lockstep at the instruction (Figure 1(b)) or
even processor stage SoR (Figure 1(a)), such as for instance
the PowerPC 750GX [19]. Those systems deliver immediate
error detection since the time elapsed between error occurrence
and its detection is upper-bounded by the latency of the
longest-latency instruction. However, intrusiveness of lockstep
implementation is huge as many values that are typically unob-
servable from outside the core must now be observable, and the
amount of information shared across cores for error detection
is high, thus requiring high-bandwidth communication means.
Note that this kind of designs are also likely to raise many
false positives due to faults that will not become errors due
to fault masking. For instance, a fault may affect a register
whose value will be overwritten before being read.
Intermediate solutions such as the Freescale Qorivva
MPC5643L microcontroller [17] deliver lockstep at the off-
core SoR (see Figure 1(c)), thus requiring low hardware
support but failing to provide timing guarantees as those
provided by instruction-level SoR. This low-cost design choice
is the one considered in this work, where we address its
timing issues. Although false positives can also occur, many
of them are already filtered inside cores, so the fraction of
false positives are expected to be much fewer than for for
instruction or processor state SoR.
III. TIMING ANALYSIS OF ERROR
DETECTION
Next we analyse the timing behaviour of error occurrence
and detection in a light lockstep system as the one in Fig-
ure 1(c) whose SoR is defined at the off-core activity level.
A. Processor Model
We consider a processor resembling the Infineon AURIX
3-core processor [20]. In particular, we analyse the behaviour
of two of its cores operating in lockstep mode. As in the
AURIX processor, those cores operate in a way that the leading
thread runs a few cycles ahead of the trailing thread. A simple
hardware checker is placed in between the trailing core and the
shared communication network. During lockstep operation, the
hardware checker stalls the bus accesses of the trailing core
and snoops leading thread activity (data, interrupts, exceptions,
etc.). Buffers are needed to retain data to be sent (leading core)
or compared (trailing core) until the bus is available. However,
such buffering does not differ from the one needed for regular
bus accesses in non-lockstep cores. On each bus access of the
leading core, the checker compares the values (address and
data if any) against those of the trailing core. On a mismatch
an error is reported raising the corresponding interrupt. If no
mismatch is detected, the trailing core remains in the same
state as the leading core. For instance, leading and trailing
cores are allowed to proceed if the memory or I/O request
does not require any answer as in a write operation. However,
only the write operation of the leading core is effectively sent.
Alternatively, both cores may remain waiting for an answer
(e.g., on a read operation). In such case only the read request
from the leading core is sent and the answer is read by both
cores. This operation mode guarantees that lockstep operation
is transparent for the rest of the system and both cores operate
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(a) Errors due to transient faults
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(b) Errors due to permanent faults
Fig. 2. Transient and permanent fault propagation latency (mean, median, max) across registers (address (A), data (D) and special purpose (SP)). Some
registers show empty latency values as they are not used by the executed bechnmarks.
with, at most, a time difference matching the time since the
leading core sends a bus request until the trailing core snoops
it. Note that the checker must operate at least at the same
speed as the bus to keep pace with it without introducing any
stall. This is not an issue since, even if the bus can send one
request per cycle, simple comparators complete comparisons
comfortably within one cycle.
Such architecture has been modelled with an enhanced
version of the SoCLib simulation framework [24] with TriCore
1.3 binaries to implement a cycle-accurate pipelined in-order
core architecture similar to the AURIX processor [20], widely
used in the automotive domain.
B. Fault Injection
We inject single bit upsets (SBU) and stuck bits (both stuck-
at-zero and stuck-at-one) to model transient, intermittent, and
permanent faults. Note that intermittent faults will behave first
as transient faults until degradation makes them large enough
so that errors occur frequently or faults become permanent.
Transient and permanent faults can be injected in any
processor component. However, in our experiments we have
injected faults only in the register file based on the observation
that faults that are not quickly propagated to the shared bus
and hence, detected, will end-up in the register file. On one
hand, the instruction cache (IL1) is only written with data
received through the bus, so the core can only corrupt the IL1
requesting wrong addresses, which would be observable in
the shared bus and thus, detected by the other lockstep core.
On the other hand, the data cache can be written with new
data fetched from the bus, where errors would be detected
analogously to those of the IL1, or by store operations. In
our particular architecture we consider write-through caches,
as in many processors used in CRTES, so write operations
are immediately propagated to the shared bus, thus allowing
lockstep to immediately detect errors.
In general, faults in logic and latches/flip-flops reach caches
and/or registers quickly and, if transient, disappear from logic
and latches/flip-flops. Faults in caches are quickly propagated
to the shared bus and thus, errors are detected soon by means
of lockstep execution. Faults in the register file, instead, may
remain undetected for a long time and so the register file is
the main target for fault injection. We perform fault injection
in all registers (and only in registers) in the specification to
study the timing behaviour of faults. If other registers exist in
hardware and are not part of the specification, our approach
should be applied on those registers analogously. Part of our
future work consists of considering write-back caches so that
faults may remain undetected for a long time in cache, as for
the register file.
Faults may occur homogeneously across registers due to
faults affecting them directly. However, they may be affected
differently due to faults occurring in other processor com-
ponents (e.g., combinational logic) that propagate to those
registers when written. Therefore, we perform fault injection
homogeneously in all registers and present combined results
in two different ways:
• Pure average. All registers are given the same weight
when computing the time elapsed between fault injection
and error manifestation in the bus. Thus, this method
corresponds to fault injection in the register file where
all registers are equally vulnerable.
• Weighted average. Results for each register are weighted
in accordance with the number of times they are written
during execution, thus considering the impact of faults in
logic and latches that propagate to particular registers.
We use the EEMBC Autobench benchmark suite [28],
which is a well-known suite reflecting the current real-world
demand of some automotive embedded systems. Given Nreg
registers, each benchmark is executed Nreg · 100 times, so
100 times per register. In any execution the particular register
under consideration is marked as faulty exactly once at a cycle
chosen randomly across the number of cycles of a fault-free
execution. Then, we measure the number of cycles elapsed
since the fault is injected until it is detected in the shared bus.
Faults undetected by the end of the execution are assumed
to be irrelevant as the program finishes execution and they
have not reached any observable device (memory or I/O).
Analogously, faults that disappear without propagating become
also irrelevant (e.g., because the register holding the fault is
overwritten before the fault propagates). This process is known
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as fault masking.
C. Results
Figure 2 shows the result of averaging out how long faults
take to propagate to the bus (error latency). Error latencies due
to transient faults are shown in Figure 2(a) while error laten-
cies due to permanent faults are shown in Figure 2(b). In both
plots error latency values are provided per register to show
error latency variability across different registers. Registers
with no bar in the plots correspond to those registers not used
by the benchmark suite except D0, whose transient faults were
always masked and never propagated, as shown later in Figure
4. Regardless of the type of the injected faults, errors in some
frequently accessed registers (e.g., D4,D3,A4,A5) are rapidly
propagated to memory and thus, shortly detected. However, a
relevant number of LLE are present for a significant number of
registers. For example, faults injected in special purpose (SP)
registers remain long time undetected as the contents of those
registers take long to propagate to the bus. Other registers
devoted to some specific functions such as A10 (stack pointer)
and A13 (return pointer) also take long to propagate, as they
are accessed mainly at subroutine calls and returns.
If we pay attention to maximum values, we observe that
some errors can propagate after several tens of million cy-
cles after the fault actually occurred, thus wasting plenty of
computation time, and thus challenging whether deadlines are
met for critical tasks. In fact, we have observed that, for the
benchmarks we have considered, average and maximum detec-
tion latency is only slightly shorter than the actual execution
time. We have confirmed this by modifying the number of
iterations of the EEMBC benchmarks, which allows increas-
ing/decreasing their execution time. For processors running at
200-300MHz the maximum observed latencies translate into
hundreds of milliseconds.
As shown, maximum error detection latency due to perma-
nent and transient faults is very similar. However, differences
in the timing behaviour of both type of faults are quite
significant. In this regard, average latency for errors due
to permanent faults is significantly higher than for transient
faults. Figure 3 shows the fraction of errors with detection
latencies above 10,000 and 100,000 cycles for transient and
permanent faults. Note that the fraction of LLE is computed
with respect to the total number of errors detected, not the
total number of faults injected. As shown in the figure, in the
case of permanent faults the fraction of LLE is much more
significant than for transient faults. On average, the fraction
of errors with detection latencies above 100,000 cycles is
5.1% and 0.4% for permanent and transient faults, respectively.
The reason for the different behaviour across transient and
permanent faults is the masking factor. Masking makes a
significant fraction of the transient faults to be masked, and
so disappear, before detection. Figure 4 shows the fraction of
transient faults injected that are detected as errors, undetected,
and masked. As shown in this figure, a very large fraction of
the transient faults injected is masked. Note that some transient
faults injected remain undetected at the end of the execution
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because the register where faults have been injected are never
used again in those benchmarks.
Finally, we are also interested on studying the behaviour
of errors depending on whether they occur in the register
file or in other components (e.g., functional units, latches,
etc.) propagating to the register file. For that purpose, we
have computed pure average and weighted average latency
results (Fig. 5). Pure average results correspond to errors
in the register file, which occur with uniform probabilities
across registers. Weighted results take into account how often
registers are written, as those registers written more often
have higher probabilities of storing wrong values propagated
due to faults in other components. Weighted average latency
values reported are lower than pure average latency values.
This is mainly because D15 (implicit data) and A15 (implicit
address), which are the registers written more often during
the execution, have lower average latency. However, despite
of those lower weighted latency values, large latencies are
frequent enough to challenge the lockstep architecture timing
correctness as they would show up late in many cases.
IV. LIVE: ENFORCING EARLY ERROR
DETECTION
As explained in Section III, in a processor with a write-
through data cache all errors either reach the shared commu-
nication network almost immediately or reach the register file.
Once a register holds wrong data, such data can be overwritten,
propagated to other registers or propagated to the shared
communication network. If wrong data are eventually sent to
the network before the end of the execution of the program
– a software component in automotive systems – the fault
can lead to wrong program results. However, once a register
holds wrong data it is non-obvious whether a correct execution
state will be reached (no register holds wrong data) or wrong
data will be eventually sent through the network. Thus, it is
more convenient detecting a potential error soon than waiting
for the fault to, hopefully, disappear (being masked) before
propagating.
The simplest way to detect errors is exposing register
values in the network so that they can be compared and any
wrong value identified. For that purpose we propose LiVe,
which stands for LIghtly VErbose operation. LiVe relies on
sending register file contents through the network so that
error detection features of lockstep can detect any discrepancy
across values in the different cores. Next we describe the
mechanism in detail and evaluate its performance impact.
A. Hardware Model
LiVe is an operation mode suitable for a processor model as
the one described in Section III-A. LiVe focuses on improving
the error detection latency of light lockstep architectures. LiVe
does not provide any further error detection capability and
only those errors that can be detected with the light lockstep
operation will be detected when using those processors in
LiVe mode. The baseline processor we use employs two
functionally identical cores, the leading and the trailing core,
and a hardware checker in charge of detecting errors originated
at cores affecting the program execution (see Figure 6). In this
baseline processor faults affecting leading and trailing cores
producing the same error manifestation remain undetected. To
minimize this effect leading and trailing cores use diverse
hardware implementations based on the use of different logic
functions, different layouts, and placement, in such a way
that the probability of experiencing the very same fault in
the two cores simultaneously, thus leading to the same error
manifestation, is minimized. Moreover, leading and trailing
cores do not execute the same code at the same time which
also minimizes the likelihood of simultaneous identical error
manifestations. Execution in the trailing core is shifted by few
cycles. In particular its execution is delayed by at least the
number of cycles required to send data from the leading core
to the checker in the trailing core.
B. Detailed Design
LiVe defines a Maximum Detection Interval (or MDI for
short). Such MDI is the maximum time that can elapse since
a register holds wrong data until such value is sent to the
network. Enforcing the MDI not to be exceeded requires each
register to be sent to the network every MDI cycles at most.
Two different approaches exist for sending register values
through the shared communication network:
• Burst transmission. This approach relies on sending all
registers MDI cycles after the last time they were sent.
Thus, a counter is set to MDI and decremented every
cycle. Whenever it reaches zero, it is set back to MDI
to start decrementing it again in the next cycle and all
registers are sent uninterruptedly. If a shared bus or the
like is used, this approach may cause some significant bus
contention periodically, thus creating some undesirable
timing effects (glitches) if those bursts occur simultane-
ously with other events (e.g., communications from other
cores).
7Fig. 6. Steps followed in LiVe for error detection in a register.
• Sporadic transmission. Alternatively, MDI can be defined
as MDI = Nreg · IRTI , where Nreg is the total
number of registers and IRTI stands for Inter-Register
Transmission Interval. Then, one register is sent every
IRTI cycles in a round-robin fashion so that any register
is sent exactly every MDI cycles. By doing so bursts
are avoided and any other component competing for the
shared bus will only be affected by the transmission of a
single register every IRTI cycles.
In LiVe we consider the sporadic transmission approach since
it is the one with fewer side effects as glitches are avoided,
thus preventing issues related to the time-alignment of events
across components.
Registers communication is performed by means of non-
blocking write operations (cores do not wait for any answer)
whose destination address is not mapped into any device. By
doing so, the register value will be exposed into the network
and the core executing the trailing thread will snoop the value
for error detection, but no functional impact will occur because
of those write operations.
Error detection occurs as shown in Figure 6. First, both
cores initiate the transmission of a particular register value (Ri
in the figure). Then, the trailing core stalls until the leading
core communication can be snooped. Eventually, leading core
Ri value is granted access to the shared communication
network and the trailing core can snoop it. Values are then
compared and errors (if any) detected.
Overall, the maximum latency elapsed since an error occurs
until it is detected is determined by (i) how long an error takes
to reach a register (typically very few cycles), (ii) how much
time is elapsed since a register holds a wrong value until it
is sent through the network (MDI cycles at most), and (iii)
how long it takes since a value is sent through the network
until it reaches the trailing core and the error is eventually
notified (again, typically few cycles). Thus, maximum error
detection latency mostly depends on MDI, which depends on
Nreg (a fixed value) and IRTI. Therefore, IRTI must be set
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Fig. 7. Performance degradation for different MID values.
low enough so that MDI is also low, but large enough so
that little network bandwidth is wasted. There is no particular
rule to set IRTI (and so MDI) since affordable overheads and
error detection latencies depend on the user needs. However,
as a rule of thumb, one would expect IRTI to be set so that
MDI is in the order of few microseconds given that programs
implementing safety-related functions may last in the order
of few milliseconds [37]. For instance, if the architecture
under consideration has Nreg = 32 and cycle time is 4ns (so
frequency is 250MHz), IRTI = 100 would lead to a MDI
of 3,200 cycles, so 12.8µs. Next we study the impact of IRTI
and MDI in performance.
C. Performance
In order to study the performance overhead of LiVe, we use
the same evaluation framework as in Section III. Although
there is a tradeoff between IRTI and performance overhead
caused due to shared communication network contention,
CRTES are typically designed not to experience high con-
tention to guarantee low worst-case execution time (WCET)
values. For instance, AURIX [20] uses a crossbar where no
contention can be experienced in the network itself. Still,
contention can be experienced in the device sending data if
other data are ready to be sent (e.g., the core may be willing
to write some data in memory). In our case we can use such
crossbar as long as the core executing the trailing thread can
snoop data from the leading thread crossbar.
Figure 7 shows the impact on average execution time
of LiVe for different IRTI values. Performance overhead of
LiVe is huge for very low IRTI values (e.g., IRTI=3, so
MDI≈100) as all register values are sent in a short time frame
(one register every three cycles). However, the performance
overhead becomes negligible as IRTI grows, being 6% for 30
cycles (MDI≈1,000) and less than 1% for values above 300
cycles (MDI≈10,000). Results confirm the effectiveness of our
LiVe approach, which has negligible impact on performance
while reducing the detection time for LLE, which takes several
millions of cycles to propagate in some cases and, potentially,
can take even longer if LiVe is not in place.
D. Analyzing LiVe Suitability for Harsh Environments
LiVe enforces faults in the register file to be visible before
they naturally manifest. One side of the coin is that period-
ically sending register contents to the shared interconnection
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Fig. 8. Estimated Masking factor for different MID values.
network makes error detection latencies to be upper-bounded.
The other side of the coin is that a non-negligible fraction
of the transient faults would have been masked but LiVe
detects them as errors before such masking occurs. Note,
however, that early detection of errors that would have been
masked otherwise does not impact systems’s safety. On an
error detection the system can transition to a safe state.
This may imply that during such transition and the recovery
process the system is unavailable. However, unavailability is
a lower-magnitude problem than safety. Moreover, power and
performance of the system may also be affected due to the
overheads introduced by the more frequent transition to a safe
state and the recovery steps needed.
To quantify the impact of the masking effect degradation
introduced by LiVe we compute the raw masking factor of
several applications and how it degrades due to LiVe. We
compute the raw masking factor by measuring the fraction
of injected faults that do not lead to an error detected by
the lockstep mechanism. In particular, we measure the ratio
between masked faults and injected faults.
We compute the masking factor when LiVe is used for
MDI values of 10,000 and 100,000 cycles, which show to
have low performance overhead in Figure 7. Results for the
different masking factors are shown in Figure 8. As shown,
raw masking factors for transient faults when LiVe is not in
place are around 68%. LiVe decreases slightly the masking
factor down to 63% when MID is 100,000 cycles. If MDI
is 10,000 cycles, masking factor decreases down to 49% on
average. This behaviour is expected as most of the faults are
masked quickly after they occur, thus preventing LiVe from
prematurely detecting them. However, as MDI decreases, the
likelihood of exposing wrong values that would have been
masked later increases, thus leading to error detections that
decrease the masking factor.
V. CERTIFICATION-FRIENDLY RECOVERY MECHANISMS
Hardware faults such as transient and permanent faults may
make programs in charge of some safety-related functions
lead to unexpected behaviour. Whenever this occurs, hard-
ware/software means must take care of detecting any error and
transitioning to a fail-safe state. As stated in previous sections,
in the context of CRTES, error detection can be satisfactorily
carried out by deploying light-lockstep architectures operating
in LiVe mode. In this section, we analyse which recovery
mechanisms are suitable for light-lockstep architectures and
how those mechanisms benefit from using the system op-
erating in LiVe mode. We first review the implications of
certification in error detection and recovery. Then, we show
how LiVe helps recovery mechanisms to effectively meet
certification requirements.
A. Certification Implications
Systems implementing safety-related functions need to go
through a certification process. For instance, certification
against ISO26262 standard [21] is required in the automotive
domain. Certification is deemed as an expensive process
since the number of test cases required for the validation
and verification (V&V) of systems grows in pace with the
complexity of those systems. Thus, V&V of multicore systems
in charge of executing several safety-related functions is, at
least, challenging. In the context of the hardware product
development, certification activities focus on the following
three aspects [21]: (1) the analysis of potential hardware faults
and their effects, (2) the implementation of the technical
safety concept, and (3) the coordination with the software
development. For the analysis of the potential faults and their
effects, extensive fault-injection experiments and tests have to
be carried out to obtain suitable values of diagnostic coverage
and latent fault metrics. The implementation of the technical
safety concept includes the evidence of the effectiveness of the
safety mechanisms to reach a fail-safe state fast enough when
a fault occurs. Finally, in the coordination with the software
development, the functions related to the error detection,
indication, and handling of safety-related hardware elements
are included. Note that hardware and software developments
are tigthly coupled and the interactions of those elements in
relation to system’s safety need to be investigated as well.
For instance, recovery through repetition is one of the
accepted error handling methods in ISO26262 in the auto-
motive domain. Such method consists of resetting the partic-
ular hardware components involved in the faulty execution
and reexecuting affected software components (or some of
its runnables as described in the AUTOSAR standard for
automotive software design [6])2. Additionally, according to
ISO26262-6:2011 clause 10.4.3, generating test cases for
software resource usage testing must allow determining the
maximum execution time of the program under analysis to
prove the schedulability of the integrated system. However,
as shown in Section III, regular light-lockstep architectures do
not provide an upper-bounded error detection latency and, this
is at odds with having an upper-bounded execution time of the
program.
B. Recovery of Errors due to Transient Faults
The lockstep processor model used always operates in
lockstep mode. This means that two instances of the same
application run in the leading and trailing cores simultaneously
as required to fulfill the highest criticality levels in ISO26262.
Since lockstep execution is a form of error detection but not
correction per se, on an error, an interrupt is triggered and
the real-time operating system (RTOS) on top is in charge of
2Note that similar concepts apply to the avionics case since avionics systems
build upon the Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) [1] software paradigm,
which has significant similarities with the automotive one [35].
9taking any recovery action needed. The most trivial recovery
mechanism is the one that, on the occurrence of an error during
application execution, sets the system to a fail-safe state, resets
the system to reach an error-free processor state and retries
the execution of the application from the beginning. However,
this trivial approach that perfectly fits with ISO26262 recov-
ery mechanism requirements [21] has several limitations. As
shown in Section III, error detection may occur long after
error occurrence, thus leading to long time wasted perform-
ing useless computation. While this is not a challenge for
functional correctness, it is detrimental for timing correctness
since processor usage increases and available resources may
be exhausted, leading to missing the scheduled deadlines so
that the transition to a fail-safe state occurs too late or the
unavailability of the system lasts too long. Furthermore, to
cope with the demand for increased functionality, it is desirable
to allow multiple safety-relevant applications execute in the
same system simultaneously using multicore microcontrollers.
If multiple safety-relevant applications with different criticality
levels run simultaneously, resetting the system may not be
acceptable. For instance, it cannot be allowed that an ASIL B
or ASIL C application triggers a system reset if an ASIL D
application is also being run, as this would violate the required
isolation across different integrity levels making an ASIL D
application depend on lower integrity ones.
In this context, checkpointing and rollback recovery mech-
anisms arise as an effective solution to cope with the need
for selective recovery from errors of each application and to
perform the recovery short after errors occur to improve the
schedulability of the system in the presence of faults [12].
Checkpointing and rollback recovery requires saving snapshots
of the state of the application periodically and, on an error,
rollback the state to the latest error-free snapshot. Checkpoints
are performed at several points in the execution of a program
and in every checkpoint the state of the processor has to be
saved in a memory component with enough storage capacity.
The straightforward approach to perform a checkpoint is to
suspend the execution of the application while the contents
of processor’s memory and registers (so its architectural state)
are written in memory. Recovery is carried out by reloading
the original application binary file and restoring the processor
state that was checkpointed. The cost of storing the application
snapshots is non-negligible and both, the memory and com-
putation time overhead due to storing the snapshot, have to be
considered in the feasibility analysis. In general, checkpointing
is cheap at task boundaries where just few inter-task messages
need to be stored. This makes user-controlled checkpointing to
be the most appealing checkpointing mechanism in the context
of CRTES where typically storage space is highly constrained.
C. Recovery of Errors due to Permanent and Intermittent
Faults
When recovery through repetition mechanisms are used in
the presence of permanent faults, task execution is systemat-
ically interrupted before completion as permanent faults can
lead to systematic errors that reproduce in every repetition
in the same point of task’s execution. For intermittent faults,
Fig. 9. Flow diagram of the permanent and transient errors recovery
mechanism.
that may reproduce in several consecutive repetitions of the
task, task completion is neither guaranteed. Therefore, to
efficiently tolerate permanent and intermittent faults further
safety mechanisms are required. Otherwise, recovery through
repetition schemes will end-up looping infinitely and system’s
safety – or at least availability – will be compromised. The
first requirement to effectively recover from permanent faults
is fault diagnosis. The basic criterion to classify faults as either
permanent or transient is error persistence [7]. For instance,
this approach has already been explored in the context of faults
in cache memories [2]. Note that more complex diagnosis
mechanisms relying on the activation reproducibility [16] al-
low distinguishing between intermittent and permanent faults.
However, in the automotive domain either permanent or
intermittent faults require transitioning the system to fail-safe
state. In this context, error persistence is a valid metric to
allow the system to take the correct action. Error persistence
can be measured in terms of the number of consecutive non-
error free task executions. When the error persistence is above
a given threshold, an exception is raised and the system
needs to transition to a fail-safe state. Safety-critical systems
require the existence of safe-points that allow the system
to inform the user or other sub-systems that a given task
was not able to complete. Error persistence threshold is set
according to the expected transient fault rate λ, which is a
known parameter. If we assume a Poisson error distribution,
the average number of errors in a time interval T is given by
λT . Then, the expected number of errors affecting a given task
is proportional to the task worst-case execution time (WCET).
In general, the number of faults Kth above which a fault is
to be considered permanent is an integer value no lower than
dWCET ∗ λ+Nke, where Nk is a safety margin that has to
be set according to the number of times a task can be allowed
to reexecute before transitioning the system to a fail-safe state.
D. Timely Recovery with LiVe
Systems in charge of safety-related functions have to tol-
erate errors due to both transient and permanent faults on a
timely manner. To ensure timing guarantees in the presence
of errors there are two main possibilities: (1) the deadline
is missed and a recovery mechanism is provided so that the
system’s safety is not compromised. The recovery in this case
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Fig. 10. Normalized recovery time in light-lockstep systems with and without LiVe.
may decide not to re-execute the task and simply take the
system to a safe state. (2) The system is designed in such
a way that enough execution time slack (safety margin) is
provided to allow one ore several task re-executions (i.e. to
tolerate a given number of errors).
Obviously, in a recovery-through repetition approach the
safety margin is not enough to recover from more than a given
number of errors. On every error diagnosing the type of fault
causing the error is required. This is done based on the actual
number of re-executions and the re-execution threshold (Kth)
to either restart the task again or to set the system to a fail-
safe state. The complete recovery process flow for permanent
and transient fault recovery is illustrated in Figure 9. In the
case of transient faults the exact number of errors that can be
tolerated (recovered from) depends on when the error appears
and which task the error affects, as this determines the exact
amount of computation time required for the recovery. The
fault-tolerant capabilities of a system running several critical
tasks can be represented with a given scheduling probability
[12]. The use of LiVe increases the probability of the system to
remain schedulable as it minimizes the computation time that
is wasted. Having more computation time ensures maximizing
the probability of scheduling a task in the system. In other
words, using LiVe reduces the probability of tasks missing
their deadlines.
In the case of regular light-lockstep schemes the presence of
LLE compromises the effectiveness of recovery mechanisms
based on recovery through repetition. When a single task is
running in the microcontroller, a LLE detected with lockstep,
as any other error, forces the system to be reset and the
task to be re-executed. However, in order to tolerate LLE
due to permanent and transient faults very large safety time
margins are needed. In practice, timing guardbands of about
Kth × WCETt, where WCETt stands for the WCET of
the task, are required in accordance with the observations in
Section III, where it is shown that some LLE experience a
detection latency that is in the order of task’s execution time.
On the contrary, the use of LiVe ensures that errors are
strictly detected in around MDI cycles. For instance, in the
architecture considered errors manifest off-core or reach a
register in few cycles (less than 10). Thus, given a MDI of
10,000 cycles, any error is detected in at most 10,010 cycles
(e.g., 50 microseconds at 200MHz). If LiVe is not used, then
error detection latency can be as high as the execution time of
tasks, which typically last in the order of some milliseconds
(so around 2 orders of magnitude more than with LiVe).
Once an error is detected, our mechanisms also provide tight
upper-bounds to the recovery and diagnosis latency as shown
in Figure 10. Again, our comparison against the baseline
case shows that latencies decrease from some milliseconds
to some tens of microseconds only. Therefore, probabilities to
successfully schedule all tasks despite errors increase.
When LiVe is deployed in the lockstep processor the safety
time margin is drastically reduced. For instance, if LiVe is
deployed with a MDI of 100,000 cycles and Kth = 2, 200,000
cycles are required to detect a permanent fault. Figure 10
shows the required diagnosis time for permanent faults in
a light-lockstep architecture with and without LiVe. In this
figure we show the time required for recovery when using LiVe
with MDI=10,000 and MDI=100,000, and the time required
for recovery in a regular light-lockstep architecture (observed
and safe bars). Time is normalised with respect to 2 times
the actual execution time of the benchmarks. Bars labeled as
observed represent the recovery time for the maximum error
latencies observed in the experiments, whereas bars labeled as
safe represent the required time needed to guarantee a worst-
case recovery. For worst-case recovery we consider that the
error can potentially be detected in the last cycle of task’s
execution. For instance, as shown, the diagnosis latency is only
2× 0.25% of the cacheb program execution time with LiVe
(MDI=100,000 cycles) instead of roughly 2×WCETcacheb.
Finally, in the context of mixed-criticality systems running
on top of multicore microcontrollers there are further issues
to be addressed. If LiVe is not in place, LLE complicate the
recovery process when multiple applications run concurrently.
On the one hand, resetting the system for every faulty task
execution is not doable when having applications with differ-
ent criticality levels. On the other hand, if an error can be
potentially detected after tens or hundreds of milliseconds, it
is very difficult – if at all possible – to determine the exact
point at which the error was produced in order to perform the
recovery of the corresponding task and all other dependent
tasks. In this context, the use of LiVe simplifies the recovery
process as error detection latency can be upper-bounded to
easily identify recovery points.
VI. RELATED WORK
Literature on error detection and correction is abundant.
However, particular constraints of CRTES industry, such as
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very high coverage, functional and timing correctness needs,
and certification processes, pose severe limitations on the
techniques that can be effectively adopted. Typically, CRTES
industry relies on error detection and correction codes for
memory devices such as main memory and caches [14] and
space redundancy for the remaining devices as this allows to
deal with any type of error [25], [19], [17], [20], [34]. Note that
solutions based on time redundancy such as redundant multi-
threaded (RMT) processors [31], [27] are typically dismissed
as they do not provide guarantees to detect faults due to
degradation and “telegraph radio noise” [4].
Solutions based on lockstep are popular and used in recent
products to provide functional correctness. The design trade-
offs of different implementations of lockstep architectures for
the automotive domain have been analysed in [8]. Light lock-
step architectures are attractive as little hardware overhead is
incurred and those designs can be easily used in non-lockstep
mode as proposed in [22]. In [26] is proposed a flexible
redundancy scheme that is able to maximize the utilization
of computation resources in the presence of applications with
different criticality levels. Mechanisms described in [22] and
[26] are orthogonal to our proposal, which is used only
under lockstep operation. It must be noted that the approach
in [26] reduces the hardware overhead due to redundancy
by making trailing and leading cores to smartly share L1
data cache. This reduction in the hardware resources comes,
however, at the expense of limiting the flexibility of the design,
since running in non-lockstep mode, as needed for lowly
critical applications, may not be possible. Finally, several light
lockstep systems have been recently proposed by some of the
main chip vendors in the automotive domain [20], [17], [34].
However, light lockstep fails to provide timing correctness
as needed in safety-related functions, since errors may be
detected long after they occur, thus potentially exhausting the
time slack available for re-executing faulty functions. To the
best of our knowledge, our solution, LiVe, is the first approach
guaranteeing functional and timing correctness on top of light
lockstep CRTES.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Safety-critical functions require means for error detection
and correction to guarantee functional and timing correctness,
which must be proven against functional safety standards such
as ISO26262 in the automotive domain. Lockstep execution
has been widely deployed for that purpose. However, redesign-
ing cores for timely error detection raises costs and decreases
flexibility as it is unclear how lockstep cores can operate in
non-lockstep mode, as needed in mixed-criticality systems.
In this paper we propose LiVe, a simple solution to en-
able both functional and timing correctness in light lockstep
systems where design costs are kept low and flexibility is
attained so that cores can be used in either lockstep or non-
lockstep mode. We show how LiVe fits the needs of safety
standards and prove its negligible impact in performance. We
also analyse the side effects of LiVe in the context of error
recovery and prove that existing recovery mechanisms can be
much more effective on top of processors implementing LiVe.
The investigation of recovery mechanisms paired with LiVe
other than periodic checkpointing are left for future work.
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